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1 Introduction  
As	a	Non-EU	member	Switzerland	is	not	obliged	to	implement	the	Youth	Guarantee	scheme	
As	 such,	 the	national	 resonance	 regarding	 this	EU	programme	 is	very	modest	and	 there	 is	
little	benefit	in	measuring	the	discourse	on	the	Youth	Guarantee	in	Switzerland.	In	search	of	
a	comparable	policy	event	we	decided	to	focus	on	a	public	referendum	from	the	year	2003	
that	advocates	the	improvement	of	young	people’s	prospects	in	education	and	in	the	labour	
market,	 which	 would	 enable	 us	 to	 draw	 some	 equivalent	 conclusions	 on	 the	 discourse	
surrounding	 youth	 policy	 in	 Switzerland.	 Similar	 to	 the	 EU’s	 Youth	 Guarantee,	 the	 Swiss	
referendum	 Apprenticeship	 Initiative	 (“Lehrstelleninitiative”)	 –	 proposed	 a	 state-regulated	
guarantee	on	Vocational	Education	and	Training	(VET).	
First	we	will	provide	a	summary	and	analysis	of	the	national	discourse	on	the		Apprenticeship	
Initiative	 that	 was	 clearly	 rejected	 in	 2003	 in	 section	 two.	 The	 discourse	 involves	 the	
opponents	 arguing	 from	an	economically	 liberal	 point	of	 view,	 showing	 reluctance	 to	 give	
more	 power	 to	 the	 central	 state	 and	 the	 proponents	 emphasising	 the	 decrease	 in	 the	
amount	of	apprenticeship	positions	in	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s.	
Since	no	national	department	for	youth	exists	in	Switzerland,	the	authorities	responsible	for	
youth	policy	are	located	on	a	cantonal	or	local	level.	Hence,	we	propose	to	take	a	look	at	the	
cantonal	implementation	of	some	youth	policies	in	section	three.	The	Canton	of	Jura	as	one	
of	the	only	two	Swiss	cantons,	which	have	a	youth	guarantee	in	their	cantonal	constitution,	
will	be	analysed	as	a	case	study.	
Three	 Swiss	 Active	 Labour	 Market	 Policy	 (ALMP)	 measures	 for	 young	 people	 will	 be	
presented	 in	 section	 four.	 The	 focus	will	 be	on	 the	horizontal	 and	vertical	 coordination	of	
these	measures,	how	they	are	implemented	in	different	cantons,	and	the	evaluation	of	these	
programmes.		
	
2	The	Swiss	Apprenticeship	Initiative	
2.1	History	and	Claims	of	the	Apprenticeship	Initiative	
The	 Apprenticeship	 Initiative	 was	 submitted	 on	 the	 26th	 of	 October	 1999	 by	 the	 Swiss	
Federation	 of	 Trade	Unions	 (Schweizerischer	Gewerkschaftsbund)	 in	 cooperation	with	 left-
wing	 youth	 parties.1	 Its	 basic	 claim	was	 to	 establish	 a	 constitutional	 right	 for	 a	 sufficient	
amount	 of	 apprenticeship	 positions,	 for	 which	 the	 federal	 government	 and	 the	 cantons	
should	be	responsible.	In	order	to	do	so,	the	federal	government	ought	to	establish	a	fund,	
which	 is	 financed	 by	 contributions	 from	 all	 employers.	 In	 consideration	 of	 the	 expenses	
caused	by	offering	 training	positions,	 employers	who	already	provide	 training	positions	of	
high	quality	would	contribute	less.	The	allocation	of	the	fund	amongst	the	cantons	would	be	
																																								 																				
1	 In	 Switzerland	 with	 its	 semi-direct	 democratic	 system,	 any	 group	 or	 individual	 is	 able	 to	 force	 a	 national	
referendum	 on	 a	 certain	 topic	 if	 they	 are	 able	 to	 collect	 100’000	 valid	 signatures	 of	 Swiss	 citizens	 that	 are	
entitled	to	vote.	
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coordinated	 by	 the	 federal	 government	 and	 the	 cantons	 would	 be	 responsible	 for	
developing	and	implementing	the	measures	in	cooperation	with	the	social	partners.	How	the	
specific	measures	would	be	carried	out	is	not	defined	in	the	initiative’s	text.2	
The	 similarities	 to	 the	 EU’s	 Youth	 Guarantee	 lie	 in	 the	 constitutional	 right	 for	 sufficient	
vocational	education	and	training	(which,	as	a	binding	promise,	 is	a	key	point	of	the	Youth	
Guarantee	concept)	and	 in	the	mixture	of	vertical	and	horizontal	coordination:	The	federal	
government	has	 the	 responsibility	of	 creating	a	 sufficient	 amount	of	 training	positions,	 by	
arranging	the	establishment	of	the	VET	fund	and	organising	the	allocation	of	its	resources.	In	
cooperation	with	the	social	partners,	the	cantons	are	in	charge	of	budgeting	the	resources.	
One	 crucial	 difference	 is	 that	 the	 Apprenticeship	 Initiative,	 although	 implicitly	 aimed	 at	
adolescents,	does	not	have	an	age	limit	as	is	the	case	with	the	EU’s	Youth	Guarantee.	
The	referendum	on	the	18th	of	May	2003	was	clearly	rejected	with	68.4%	of	votes	against	it	
(Schweizerischer	Bundesrat	2003).	The	approval	rate	was	distinctively	higher	in	the	French-
speaking	Switzerland	with	43%	and	in	the	Italian-speaking	part	of	Switzerland	with	39%	than	
in	 the	 German-speaking	 part	 (24%).	 Such	 a	 gap	 is	 not	 unusual	 for	 Switzerland	 since	 the	
French-speaking	 part	 is	 traditionally	 less	 critical	 towards	 proposals	 initiated	 from	 the	
politically	 left	 side	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum.	 It	 is	 in	 line	 with	 this	 insight	 that	 the	 voting	
behaviour	 was	 largely	 polarised	 based	 on	 the	 positions	 on	 a	 left-right	 scale	 and	 party	
membership	 respectively.	 Accordingly,	 only	 members	 of	 the	 Socialdemocratic	 Party	 (SP)	
supported	 the	 initiative	 with	 an	 approval	 rate	 of	 74%	 within	 the	 party.	 The	 share	 of	
supporters	within	the	other	parties	lay	around	20%	or	less	3	(Longchamp	et	al.	2003:	5f).		
Six	 years	 after	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	 Apprenticeship	 Initiative	 a	 separate	 cantonal		
apprenticeship	 referendum	 took	place	 in	 Canton	 St.	Gallen	 (27th	 of	 September	 2009).	 The	
initiative	–	submitted	by	the	Young	Socialist	Party	(JUSO)	–	demanded	the	creation	of	a	fund	
similar	to	the	fund	suggested	in	the	Apprenticeship	Initiative.	The	St.	Gallen	referendum	was	
also	 rejected	 with	 a	 high	 share	 of	 62.6%	 of	 votes	 against	 it	 (Giezendanner	 2009).	 The	
discourse	 was	 comparable	 to	 the	 one	 on	 the	 national	 Apprenticeship	 Initiative,	 which	 is	
outlined	 in	more	detail	 in	 the	 following	 section.	 This	outcome	demonstrates	 that	 in	2009,	
shortly	 after	 the	peak	of	 a	 shortage	of	 apprenticeship	positions	 in	 the	 country,	 at	 least	 in	
Canton	St.	Gallen,	people’s	attitude	was	still	very	much	against	towards	a	more	centralised	
regulation	of	the	apprenticeship	market.	
	
																																								 																				
2	 Schweizerische	 Bundeskanzlei.	 Eidgenössische	 Volksinitiative	 'für	 ein	 ausreichendes	 Berufsbildungsangebot	
(Lehrstellen-Initiative).	https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis284t.html.	[18.08.2016].	
3	One	must	mention	that	the	Swiss	population	has	always	been	much	more	critical	towards	left-wing	initiatives	
and	 referenda	 and	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	 long	 overall	 tendency	 to	 vote	 ‘No’	 against	 people’s	 initiatives	 in	
general.	 In	 general,	 this	makes	 it	 harder	 to	 assess	 people’s	 contentual	 attitude	 towards	 a	 subject	 that	 was	
voted	on.	
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2.2	Discourse	on	the	Apprenticeship	Initiative	
2.2.1 Federal Council and Parliament 
The	 Swiss	 Federal	 Council	 (Bundesrat)	 recommended	 that	 both	 the	 people	 and	
Parliamentvote	 against	 the	 Apprenticeship	 Initiative.	 Despite	 appreciating	 the	 idea	 of	
providing	more	training	positions,	the	Federal	Council	rejected	the	initiative,	reasoning	with	
two	arguments:	First,	it	was	assumed	that	the	implementation	of	the	initiative	would	lead	to	
more	 bureaucracy	 and	 administration.	 Second,	 the	 initiative’s	 approach	 was	 seen	 as	
undifferentiated,	 since	 different	 professional	 branches	 require	 different	 measures.	 The	
Council	 also	 expressed	 its	 concern	 that	 the	 firms’	 incentives	 to	 provide	 training	 positions	
might	 be	 lowered	 by	 a	 state-based	 educational	 institution	 and	 that	 the	 strong	 practical	
relevance	 of	 the	 existing	 dual-tracked	 VET	 system	 might	 therefore	 be	 threatened	
(Schweizerischer	 Bundesrat	 2000:	 98).	 Furthermore,	 the	 Federal	 Council	 asserted	 that	
existing	 laws	and	guidelines	already	provide	sufficient	ground	to	enable	all	people	 to	have	
access	 to	 an	 appropriate	 education	 in	 Switzerland.	 According	 to	 the	 Council,	 education	 is	
connected	 with	 individual	 choice	 and	 should	 not	 become	 a	 universal	 right	 (ibid.:	 112).	
Generally,	 the	 Federal	 Council	 embraced	 the	 existing	 system	 of	 horizontal	 cooperation	
between	the	administration,	the	firms	and	the	social	partners	and	was	clearly	against	a	more	
top-down	 approach	 of	 vertical	 cooperation	 with	 more	 power	 being	 given	 to	 the	 central	
state.		
As	 an	 indirect	 counterproposal	 to	 the	 Apprenticeship	 Initiative	 the	 government	 and	
parliament	put	the	freshly	revised	Federal	Act	on	Vocational	and	Professional	Education	and	
Training	(VPET)	to	the	vote.	This	law	was	passed	from	the	government	to	the	parliament	in	
September	2000	and	was	accepted	 in	December	2002	with	a	 slight	modification	 (note	 the	
strategic	deferral	by	two	years	aiming	with	the	aim	of	using	it	as	an	instrument	against	the	
Apprenticeship	 Initiative).	 It	 came	 into	effect	 in	2004,	 after	 the	Apprenticeship	 Initiative	 in	
May	2003.4	The	Federal	Council	and	the	parliament	used	the	revised	Federal	Act	on	VPET	as	
an	argument	against	the	initiative.	The	council	promoted	the	new	law	in	its	campaign	against	
the	 initiative	 by	 highlighting	 the	 following	 characteristics:	 First,	 the	 new	 law	 allows	more	
flexibility	 and	 lowers	 the	 fees	 for	 businesses	 by	 increasing	 the	 federal	 share	 of	 public	
expenses	 from	 20	 to	 25	 per	 cent,	 and	 second,	 it	 creates	 the	 possibility	 to	 force	 industry-
specific	solidarity	contributions	(Schweizerischer	Bundesrat	2000:	112).	One	could	conclude	
that	with	the	establishment	of	the	revised	Federal	Act	on	VPET	Swiss	politics	reacted	to	the	
shortage	of	 apprenticeship	positions	 in	 the	90s.	An	 important	new	 feature	was	 the	above	
mentioned	possibility	to	establish	industry-specific	cantonal	solidarity	funds.	In	the	cantons	
Fribourg,	 Neuchâtel	 and	 Geneva	 such	 solidarity	 funds	 were	 already	 in	 force	 before	 the	
revision	of	the	Federal	Act	and	in	other	cantons,	such	as	Canton	Zurich,	it	was	implemented	
as	a	result	of	the	revision.	Nationwide	professional	and	industrial	associations	are	now	able	
to	 force	all	of	 the	associated	 firms	 to	contribute	 to	a	 solidarity	 fund	 if	at	 least	30%	of	 the	
																																								 																				
4	Der	Bundesrat.	Das	Portal	der	Schweizer	Regierung:	412.10.	Bundesgesetz	vom	13.	Dezember	2002	über	die	
Berufsbildung	(Berufsbildungsgesetz,	BBG).	Chronologie.	
https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20001860/history.html	[22.08.2016].	
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firms	(with	at	 least	30%	of	an	 industry’s	employees)	already	contribute	to	an	existing	fund	
(Fleischmann	 2004:	 1).	 Providing	 the	 people	 give	 their	 consent	 in	 a	 vote,	 cantons	 may	
establish	 a	 solidarity	 fund.	 Until	 now,	 30	 associations	 and	 eight	 cantons	 have	 established	
such	 a	 mandatory	 fund.5	 In	 chapter	 three	 there	 will	 be	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 cantonal	
measures.		
The	 counterproposal	 contributed	 to	 the	 Apprenticeship	 Initiative	 being	 rejected	 by	 the	
voters	 and	 both	 chambers	 of	 the	 parliament.	 The	 former	 Secretary	 of	 Commerce	 Joseph	
Deiss	 (member	 of	 the	 Christian	 Democratic	 People's	 Party),	 an	 opponent	 of	 the	
Apprenticeship	 Initiative,	 interpreted	 the	 result	 of	 the	 vote	 as	 the	 people’s	 rejection	 of	 a	
more	 top-down,	 centralised	 form	 of	 political	 regulation.	 Despite	 agreeing	with	 the	 voting	
result	and	his	belief	that	the	existing	system	of	cooperation	works	well,	he	urged	the	firms	to	
keep	to	their	responsibility,	 to	provide	more	apprenticeship	positions	and	contribute	more	
to	 the	 financing	 of	 VET.	 In	 the	 same	 vein,	 the	 parliament	 also	 supported	 the	 horizontal	
cooperation	between	the	involved	actors	and	objected	to	a	more	vertical	cooperation	with	
the	concern	of	too	much	centralised	state	 intervention.	Personal	responsibility	and	market	
mechanisms	are	seen	as	well	 functioning	and	 the	Apprenticeship	 Initiative	was	outlined	as	
aiming	towards	functioning	the	same	ways	as	a	planned	economy.	The	revised	Federal	Act	
on	 VPET,	 which	 was	 initially	 designed	 independently	 of	 the	 initiative,	 was	 promoted.	
Furthermore,	 it	 was	 considered	 as	 being	 exaggerated	 to	 enshrine	 the	 right	 to	 VET	 in	 the	
constitution.	 Altogether,	 it	 was	 said	 that	 the	 need	 for	 action	 on	 a	 small	 scale	 was	
acknowledged,	more	 financial	 aid	 for	 VET	was	 needed,	 but	 that	 state-operated	measures	
should	not	be	at	the	centre	of	these	measures	(Raths	2003:	4f).	
2.2.2 Economic Associations  
Besides	 the	 Federal	 Council	 and	 the	parliament,	 the	major	 economic	 associations	 and	 the	
farmers’	association	were	also	against	the	Apprenticeship	Initiative.	Two	months	before	the	
referendum	 Economiesuisse	 (Swiss	 Business	 Federation)	 presented	 arguments	 from	 an	
economic	perspective.	Economiesuisse,	the	Swiss	Employers	Confederation	(Schweizerischer	
Arbeitgeberverband)	 and	 the	 Swiss	 Federation	 of	 Small	 and	 Medium	 Enterprises	
(Schweizerischer	Gewerbeverband)	warned	against	too	much	state	intervention,	bureaucracy	
and	 overregulation.	 They	 were	 concerned	 that	 the	 initiative	 would	 lead	 to	 disincentives:	
First,	they	claimed	that	firms	would	rather	financially	contribute	to	the	proposed	fund	than	
provide	training	positions.	Second,	they	warned	that	pupils	would	not	strive	for	good	school	
grades	anymore	if	training	positions	were	guaranteed.	Furthermore,	they	asserted	that	the	
state-run	 educational	 institutions	 would	 be	 the	 main	 beneficiaries	 (Raths	 2003:	 3f).	
Economiesuisse	 was	 also	 concerned	 that	 the	 practice-oriented	 dual	 VET	 system	would	 be	
threatened	by	the	initiative	and	favoured	the	revised	Federal	Act	on	VPET	(ib.:	6).	
The	economic	associations	as	powerful	opponents	of	the	Apprenticeship	Initiative	took	up	a	
liberal	 position	 in	 the	 state-versus-market	 discourse	 by	 expressing	 the	 fear	 of	 increasing	
																																								 																				
5	Staatssekretariat	für	Bildung,	Forschung	und	Innovation	SBFI:	
https://www.sbfi.admin.ch/sbfi/de/home/themen/berufsbildung/berufsbildungsfonds.html	[17.10.2016]	
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state	regulations	and	the	 increasing	 imposition	of	 financial	burdens	on	the	economy.	They	
were	hardly	addressing	the	guaranteeing	quality	of	the	initiative	with	its	central	aim	of	fixing	
the	right	to	education	within	the	constitution.	
2.2.3 Proponents 
Within	 their	 discourse,	 the	 proponents	 of	 the	 Apprenticeship	 Initiative,	 led	 by	 the	 Swiss	
Federation	 of	 Trade	Unions,	 focused	 primarily	 on	 practical,	 descriptive	 arguments	 such	 as	
the	provision	of	training	positions	or	the	financing	of	the	VET	system.	They	argued	that	there	
had	been	a	shortage	of	apprenticeship	positions	since	the	mid-1990s	and	the	adaptation	of	
the	VET	system	to	the	structural	transformation	of	the	employment	situation	(towards	more	
IT	and	communication	technology	jobs	as	well	as	other	new	services)	was	seen	as	deficient.	
Further,	 they	 put	 forward	 that	 between	 15	 and	 20	 per	 cent	 of	 yearly	 school	 leavers	 lack	
accredited	 VET	 qualification.	 Businesses	 that	 provide	 training	 positions	 have	 an	 additional	
financial	 burden	 in	 comparison	 to	 those	 that	 don’t.	 The	 so-called	 “free	 riders”	 should	 be	
obliged	 to	pay	 a	 compensatory	 fee	 to	 the	national	 fund	 (Jans	 2001:	 7).	 Peter	 Sigerist,	 the	
former	 secretary	 for	 VET	 and	 youth	 of	 the	 Federation	 of	 Trade	 Unions,	 claimed	 that	 the	
financial	contributions	of	the	federal	government	and	of	the	businesses	are	not	high	enough	
for	 the	 VET	 system	 to	 function	 sustainably.	 He	 proposed	 to	 enforce	 a	 liability	 for	 VET	
contributions	for	all	enterprises	in	order	to	lower	these	structural	imbalances	(Sigerist	2002).	
Answering	 the	 opponents’	 concerns,	 the	 proponents	 denied	 that	 the	 Apprenticeship	
Initiative	 would	 harm	 the	 Swiss	 dual	 VET	 system,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 the	 horizontal	
cooperation	 between	 the	 administration	 and	 businesses.	 The	 opponents’	 arguments	
concerning	more	bureaucracy	and	an	 increase	 in	 state	 intervention	were	answered	with	a	
principal	 denial	 and	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 new	 approach	 would	 be	 possible	 within	 the	
existing	administration	(Sigerist	2003).	There	was	no	explicit	demand	for	giving	more	power	
to	the	central	state.	The	discourse	was	lively,	even	if	only	due	to	the	necessity	of	responding	
to	the	opponents’	arguments.	All	 in	all,	the	proponents	approved	of	the	existing	horizontal	
cooperation.	
2.2.4 The voters 
The	voting	behaviour	was	 in	 line	with	the	political	 left-right	 juxtaposition.	A	VOX	post-vote	
analysis	 gave	 the	 following	 summary:	 The	 arguments	 of	 the	 supporters	 of	 the	 initiative	
referred	 to	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 the	 economic	 actors,	 the	 country’s	 and	 youth’s	 future	
perspectives,	 the	 general	 importance	 of	 education,	 and	 the	 contemporary	 need	 for	more	
training	 positions.	 Opponents	 mostly	 referred	 to	 the	 personal	 responsibility	 of	 both	
economic	actors	and	adolescents,	 the	fact	that	the	 initiative	 is	not	viable	and	that	 its	aims	
cannot	 be	 forcibly	 implemented	 (Blaser	 et	 al.	 2003:4).	 Researchers	 from	 the	 political	
department	 of	 the	 University	 of	 Bern	 confirmed	 that	 it	 was	 rather	 the	 voters’	 political	
attitude	 than	 their	 social	 position	 that	 was	 crucial	 for	 their	 choice	 (Institut	 für	
Politikwissenschaft	2003).	
	8	
	
2.2.5 Conclusion 
After	 looking	 at	 the	 discourse	 and	 the	 arguments	 on	 the	 proponents’	 as	 well	 as	 the	
opponents’	side,	it	becomes	clear	that	there	was	a	a	classical	political	distribution	according	
to	the	left-right	divided,	which	is	not	untypical	for	Swiss	votes.	The	pivotal	questions	in	the	
predominant	discourse	were:	First,	 should	 there	be	a	 centralised	 solution	with	more	 state	
regulation(s)	rather	than	a	liberal	economy	with	more	personal	responsibility	and	a	stronger	
market.	Second,	is	there	a	need	for	a	new	paradigm	or	would	changes	within	the	old	system	
of	 horizontal	 cooperation	 between	 businesses,	 the	 administration,	 and	 social	 partners	 be	
more	 fruitful?	Although	 the	proponents	defended	 the	old	horizontal	paradigm	and	denied	
that	too	much	state	intervention	and	bureaucracy	would	be	the	consequence	if	the	initiative	
were	 accepted,	 they	 did	 not	 manage	 to	 define	 the	 discourse.	 In	 general,	 there	 was	 a	
consensus	regarding	the	fact	that	cyclical	economic	developments	can	 lead	to	 less	training	
positions,	 but	 opinions	 concerning	 how	 to	 alleviate	 the	 problem	diverged	 across	 different	
interest	groups.	
3.	Youth	Guarantee	on	the	Cantonal	Level	
Although	 national	 aspirations	 to	 fix	 the	 right	 for	 VET	 in	 the	 constitution	 failed	 with	 the	
rejection	of	the	Apprenticeship	Initiative	 in	2003,	there	are	two	cantons	in	Switzerland	that	
have	enshrined	the	right	to	VET	in	their	cantonal	constitutions:	The	French-speaking	cantons	
Geneva	and	Jura.	This	section	consists	of	an	overview	of	the	cantonal	legal	situations	and	a	
small	case	study	on	the	cantonal	experience	in	the	Jura.	The	latter	is	primarily	based	on	an	
interview	with	the	head	of	the	Directorate	of	Vocational	Education	and	Training	and	Higher	
Education	(Service	de	la	formation	des	niveaux	secondaire	II	et	tertiaire	[SFO]),	which	is	part	
of	the	department	of	education,	culture	and	sports	in	Canton	Jura.		
3.1	Overview	of	Cantonal	Legislative	Situations	
Table	 1	 illustrates	 the	 cantonal	 diversity	 regarding	 the	 legislative	 regulation	 of	 Vocational	
Education	and	Training	(VET).	The	first	column	indicates	whether	a	cantonal	solidarity	fund	
has	been	established	for	VET	that	was	enabled	through	the	revised	Federal	Act	on	Vocational	
and	 Professional	 Education	 and	 Training	 as	 of	 2004.	 The	 following	 columns	 describe	 the	
content	 of	 the	 cantonal	 constitutions	 that	 concerns	 VET:	 The	 second	 column	 indicates	
whether	 the	 right	 for	 VET	 is	 enshrined	 in	 the	 cantonal	 constitution.	 The	 third	 column	
indicates	 whether	 there	 are	 any	 other	 forms	 of	 promises	 (“Gewährleistung”)	 that	 ensure	
VET,	but	are	not	strictly	legally	binding.	The	fourth	column	indicates	whether	there	are	any	
measures	 that	 remotely	 promote	 access	 to	 VET	 (“fördert	 die	 berufliche	 Ausbildung”).	 The	
fifth	column	indicates	whether	there	is	a	constitutionally	based	promise	to	organise	full-time	
schools	 for	 vocational	 education	 (this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 cantons	 with	 no	 such	
constitutional	 declaration	 do	 not	 organise	 such	 VET	 schools).	 The	 sixth	 column	 shows	
whether	financial	contributions	to	VET	are	ensured	by	the	canton	(again,	this	does	not	mean	
that	 cantons	 with	 no	 such	 constitutional	 declaration	 do	 not	 provide	 financial	 funding.	
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Table	1:	Legislative	compilation	of	cantons	regarding	VET	
	
Canton	 Cantonal	
fund	
Guarantee	 Assurance	 Promotion	 VE	
schools	
Funding	
assured	
Not	
specified	
Aargau	 	 	 	 x	 	 	 	
Appenzell	A	 	 	 	 x	 	 	 	
Appenzell	I.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 x	
Basel-Land	 	 	 x	 	 	 	 	
Basel-Stadt	 	 	 x	 	 	 	 	
Bern	 	 	 	 x	 	 	 	
Fibourg		 x	 	 x	 	 	 	 	
Geneva	 x	 x	 	 	 	 	 	
Glarus	 	 	 	 x	 x	 	 	
Graubünden	 	 	 x	 	 	 	 	
Jura	 x	 x	 	 	 	 	 	
Luzern		 	 	 	 	 	 	 x	
Neuchâtel	 x	 	 x	 	 	 	 	
Nidwalden	 	 	 	 x	 x	 	 	
Obwalden	 	 	 	 x	 	 	 	
Schaffhausen	 	 	 	 	 	 x	 	
Schwyz	 	 	 x	 	 	 	 	
Solothurn	 	 	 	 x	 x	 	 	
St.	Gallen	 	 	 	 	 	 x	 	
Tessin	 x	 	 	 	 	 	 x	
Thurgau	 	 	 	 	 x	 	 	
Uri	 	 	 	 x	 	 	 	
Vaud	 x	 	 x	 	 	 	 	
Valais/Wallis	 x	 	 	 	 	 	 x	
Zug	 	 	 	 	 	 	 x	
Zürich	 x	 	 	 x	 	 	 	
Total	 8	 2	 7	 9	 4	 2	 5	
Sources:	Der	Bundesrat.	Das	Portal	der	Schweizer	Regierung6,	
	 Staatssekretariat	für	Bildung,	Forschung	und	Innovation	SBFI7	
	
	 	
																																								 																				
6	https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/13.html	[27.10.2016].	
7	https://www.sbfi.admin.ch/sbfi/de/home/themen/berufsbildung/berufsbildungsfonds.html	[17.10.2016].	
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The	 column	 “not	 specified”	 indicates	 that	 there	 is	 no	 reference	 to	 VET	 in	 the	 respective	
cantonal	constitution.	The	table	shows	that	there	are	eight	cantons	that	have	established	a	
cantonal	fund	for	VET,	which	was	one	of	the	Apprenticeship	Initiative’s	basic	claims:	Firms	in	
these	 cantons	 have	 to	 pay	 a	 contribution	 to	 a	 cantonal	 solidarity	 fund	 that	 will	 is	
redistributed	towards	measures	that	concern	VET.	Two	of	these	eight	cantons	have	included	
the	right	to	VET	in	their	cantonal	constitutions,	which	is	another	basic	claim	of	the	initiative.		
The	firms’	contributions	to	these	compulsory	funds	vary	between	1	per	mille	(Zurich)	and	8	
per	 cent	 (Valais/Wallis)	 of	 the	 total	 wages	 that	 they	 pay.	 In	 some	 cantons	 the	 local	
authorities	 contribute	 to	 the	 funding	 (e.g.	 in	 Fribourg	 with	 50%	 coming	 from	 the	
municipalities,	 25%	 from	 the	 canton	 and	 25%	 from	 the	 employers).	 Depending	 on	 the	
canton-specific	 regulations,	 the	 fund	 can	 amongst	 other	 aspects	 include	 the	 financing	 of	
infrastructure	needed	for	VET,	 inter-company	courses	for	students,	courses	for	 instructors,	
and	 contributions	 to	 educational	 centres	 –	 regardless	 of	 the	 respective	 sector	 (Kägi	 et	 al.	
2008:	15f).	Enterprises	that	already	make	essential	contributions	to	VET,	e.g.	by	contributing	
to	an	industry-specific	solidarity	fund	or	by	making	adequate	payments	regarding	VET	are	by	
law	 not	 obliged	 to	 additionally	 contribute	 to	 the	 cantonal	 funds	 for	 VET.8	 Before	 the	
enactment	of	 this	 regulation	 there	were	 complaints	about	double	payments.	According	 to	
this	 evaluation,	 in	 some	 cases	 there	were	unclear	distinctions	between	different	 funds	on	
the	 one	 hand	 and	 between	 industries	 on	 the	 other	 hand.	 This	 has	 led	 to	 coordination	
problems	and	has	given	rise	to	administrative	efforts.	Yet,	the	overall	acceptance	of	industry-
specific	 funds	 that	promote	VET	with	 respect	 to	branch-	or	 industry-specific	 needs	 is	 high	
and	the	solidarity	 is	generally	valued	(Kägi	et	al.	2008).	The	basic	 idea	of	 the	cantonal	and	
industry-specific	funds,	which	is	to	create	solidarity	between	enterprises	that	contribute	to	
VET	by	educating	apprentices	and	others	that	do	not	contribute	(the	so	called	“free-riders”),	
can	generally	be	considered	to	be	implemented.	
	
3.2.	Case	Study:	Canton	Jura	
Jura	 together	 with	 Geneva	 are	 the	 only	 cantons	 in	 Switzerland	 with	 a	 VET	 guarantee	
enshrined	in	their	constitution.	We	focus	on	Jura,	the	youngest	of	the	Swiss	cantons,	which	is	
a	 largely	 rural	 canton	 with	 only	 72’800	 inhabitants.	 In	 an	 interview,	 the	 Head	 of	 the	
directorate	of	Vocational	Education	and	Training	and	Higher	Education	(SFO)	of	the	Canton	
Jura	(Expert	1),	described	the	article	that	has	been	in	the	constitution	since	1977	-	after	the	
Jura	split	up	 from	the	Canton	Bern	at	 the	end	of	a	 long-lasting	dispute	–	as	a	“humanistic	
idea”	that	probably	never	had	a	fundamental	impact,	not	least	because	there	have	been	few	
problems	 providing	 enough	 apprenticeship	 positions	 in	 Canton	 Jura.	 At	 the	 moment	 the	
number	 of	 young	 people	 neither	 in	 education,	 employment	 or	 training	 (NEET)	 after	
compulsory	education	amounts	to	0.5%.	According	to	Expert	1,	because	of	such	a	low	level,	
it	 is	 not	 a	 subject	 of	 any	 significance	 for	 the	 public	 debate	 and	 there	 has	 never	 been	 a	
																																								 																				
8	Staatssekretariat	für	Bildung,	Forschung	und	Innovation	SBFI:	
https://www.sbfi.admin.ch/sbfi/de/home/themen/berufsbildung/berufsbildungsfonds.html	[17.10.2016]	
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discussion	about	the	article	 in	the	constitution.	Currently,	 in	2016,	there	are	actually	more	
apprenticeship	positions	 than	 young	people	 seeking	 a	 placement	 and	 the	 vast	majority	 of	
adolescents	 are	 enrolled	 in	 a	 post-compulsory	 education.9	 An	 important	 factor	 that	
contributes	significantly	to	the	high	success	rate	of	post-compulsory	education	and	the	low	
rate	 of	 adolescents	 without	 an	 apprenticeship	 place	 after	 compulsory	 education	 in	 the	
Canton	Jura	is	what	Expert	1	labels	as	“cooperation	culture”:	The	geographical	and	personal	
proximity	 of	 the	 involved	 actors	 including	 the	 representatives	 of	 the	 administration,	
executive	 members	 of	 the	 cantonal	 government,	 business	 owners,	 social	 partners	 and	
apprentices	 creates	 informal	 personal	 relations	 and	 trust,	 which	 facilitates	 the	 process	 of	
finding	 solutions.	 He	 stresses	 the	 benefits	 of	 this	 informal	 type	 of	 horizontal	 cooperation	
that	 leads	 to	a	high	 level	of	personal	 responsibility	of	 the	different	actors.	Altogether,	 the	
federalist	model	of	dual	tracked	VET	is	seen	as	a	“success	story”.	The	proximity	between	the	
involved	actors	leads	to	a	certain	degree	of	mutual	trust.	Many	firm	owners	regard	the	state	
or	 the	canton	as	“helping”	as	a	help.	Despite	 the	overall	 success,	Expert	1	admits	 that	 this	
rather	 conservative	 system	 could	 result	 in	 a	 low	 level	 of	 innovation	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 vision.	
However,	 the	 limited	 education	 budget	 of	 the	 small	 canton	 he	 represents	 may	 foster	
creativity	that	could	support	the	process	of	solving	such	a	problem.		
The	expert	assumes	that	the	businesses’	trust	 in	the	administration	 is	strengthened	by	the	
existence	of	a	cantonal	VET	fund.	The	fund	was	established	in	2007	and	was	accepted	with	
the	large	support	of	about	two-thirds	of	the	population.	Although	the	youth	unemployment	
rate	 has	 not	 changed	 (staying	 approximately	 at	 the	 same	 very	 low	 level)	 he	 sees	 the	
establishment	of	the	fund	as	a	general	success.	He	says	that	after	a	certain	initial	opposition	
from	firms	that	were	reluctant	to	pay	an	extra	fee,	business	owners	that	train	young	people	
started	to	realise	 that	 they	occasionally	get	benefits	 from	the	additionally	paid	money,	 for	
example	 in	 form	 of	 courses	 for	 businesses	 or	 professional	 associations,	 specific	 training	
infrastructure	needed	for	training,	extra	wage	contributions	for	examiners	who	participate	in	
VET	exams,	or	the	partial	financing	of	exchange	projects.	To	conclude,	in	the	Canton	of	Jura	
there	have	been	few	problems	concerning	VET	from	the	beginning,	as	the	youth	NEET	rate	
after	compulsory	school	has	always	been	very	low.	Hence,	there	is	no	measurable	impact	of	
the	VET	guarantee	enshrined	in	the	constitution.	
	
																																								 																				
9	In	early	2016	a	working	group	that	focuses	on	refugees	was	established.	The	group	aims	to	clarify	
how	refugees	can	be	integrated	into	VET-structures	more	easily	in	order	to	facilitate	their	entrance	
into	the	labour	market.	Directly	involved	actors	are	the	directorate	of	vocational	education	and	
training	and	higher	education	(SFO),	the	directorate	of	compulsory	schooling,	the	vocational	
information	centre	(BIZ),	the	social	welfare	office	and	the	asylum	reception	centre	(Association	
jurassienne	d’accueil	des	migrants	(AJAM)).	
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4	ALMP	Measures	for	youth	
The	Swiss	Active	Labour	Market	Policies	(ALMP)	landscape	shows	great	diversity	and	there	is	
a	 lack	 of	 statistics	 that	 summarise	 and	 evaluate	 these	 ALMP	measures.	 Since	 the	 federal	
government	has	no	youth	department,	youth	policy	is	located	at	the	cantonal	and	the	local	
levels.	Due	to	Swiss	federalism,	the	cantons	are	relatively	free	to	implement	their	own	youth	
ALMP	measures.	Hence,	comparing	different	measures	at	a	national	level	presents	itself	as	a	
challenging	task.	Despite	the	cross-cantonal	diversity,	there	are	a	few	national	programmes	
that	 are	 centrally	 defined	 by	 the	 federal	 government.	 The	 relatively	 loose	 framework	
defined	by	the	federation	allows	the	actual	implementation	of	the	programmes	to	vary	from	
canton	 to	 canton.	 Hence,	 a	 comparison	 is	 nevertheless	 possible	 to	 some	 extent.	 In	 the	
following	we	present	 three	national	ALMP	measures	 for	 youth,	 analyse	 their	 coordination	
structures	and	evaluate	their	impact.		
4.1	SEMO	–	Motivation	Semester	
The	Motivation	 Semester	 (SEmestres	 de	MOtivation,	 abbreviated	 as	 SEMO)	 is	 one	 of	 the	
most	 important	 labour	market	 integration	measures	 for	young	people	who	are	eligible	 for	
Unemployment	Insurance	(UI).	Launched	in	1996,	the	target	group	of	this	measure	consists	
of	 people	 between	 the	 age	 of	 15	 and	 24	 years	who	 have	 not	 yet	 completed	 their	 upper-
secondary	 education.	 In	 September	 2014,	 5'367	 out	 of	 22'811	 young	 people,	 who	
participated	 in	 an	 Active	 Labour	Market	 Polices	 (ALMP)	 programme	 in	 Switzerland,	 were	
enrolled	in	a	SEMO.	At	the	end	of	the	programme	(by	August	2015)	51%	of	the	participants	
were	enrolled	in	a	VET	programme,	10%	found	another	solution	(internship	or	job)	and	39%	
were	still	without	any	transitional	solution	(Villiger	2015:	12).		
4.1.1 Responsible Actors 
The	 basic	 conditions	 of	 SEMO	 are	 defined	 by	 the	 State	 Secretariat	 for	 Economic	 Affairs	
(SECO),	while	the	measure	is	financed	by	the	UI	and	carried	out	by	the	cantons.	Each	canton	
takes	 care	 of	 its	 own	 projects,	 which	 in	 turn	 are	 administed	 by	 different	 associations,	
foundations	and	businesses.	Due	to	Switzerland’s	federal	system,	the	particularities	and	the	
relative	 autonomy	 of	 the	 cantons,	 the	 guidelines	 set	 by	 the	 SECO	 are	 intentionally	
formulated	in	a	vague	way	and	there	is	a	great	diversity	between	the	SEMO	programmes	of	
the	various	cantons.		
4.1.2 Financial Structure  
The	 funding	 of	 SEMO	 consists	 of	 two	 parts.	 According	 to	 art.	 97b	 of	 the	 unemployment	
insurance	ordinance	AVIV	the	UI	 is	 legally	obliged	to	contribute	to	SEMO	and	assumes	the	
responsibility	 for	 the	main	 financing	 (93%)	 of	 the	 SEMO.	 The	 other	 7%	 are	 contributions	
from	other	institutions	such	as	social	services	(Villiger	2015:	12).	This	means	that	all	financial	
regulations	 regarding	 SEMO	 that	 are	 financed	 by	 the	 UI	 are	 part	 of	 Swiss	 federal	 law.	 In	
order	 to	 receive	 financial	 support	 from	 the	 UI,	 which	 is	 distributed	 by	 the	 cantonal	
employment	agency,	the	programme	applicants	as	well	as	the	local	actors	such	as	the	social	
agencies	or	private	companies	that	offer	SEMO	programmes	have	to	conform	with	the	laws	
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stated	 in	 the	unemployment	 insurance	act	 (AVIG).	Based	on	 the	calculation	of	24‘000	CHF	
per	person	and	depending	on	the	number	of	job	seekers,	each	canton	receives	a	share	of	the	
total	amount	of	68’500’000	CHF	that	the	UI	spends	annually	on	SEMO.	Once	the	money	 is	
distributed	 amongst	 the	 cantons,	 the	 cantons	 are	 free	 to	 decide	 how	 and	 on	 what	
programmes	 they	 want	 to	 spend	 the	 budget:	 For	 example,	 on	 the	 Regional	 Employment	
Centre	(RAV),	on	ALMP	programmes	for	adults,	or	on	ALMP	for	young	people	such	as	SEMO.		
4.1.3 Coordination of Public Actors at the Local Level 
The	 local	 SEMO	 programme	 providers	 are	 obliged	 to	 involve	 the	 cantonal	 employment	
agencies	 during	 the	 planning	 phases	 of	 their	 projects	 (art.	 98a	 AVIV).	 This	 was	 made	
mandatory	 by	 a	 written	 petition,	 which	 was	 submitted	 by	 the	 cantonal	 employment	
agencies	to	the	Federal	Compensation	Office	(see	Figure	1	below).	In	order	to	be	funded	by	
governmental	money,	the	local	actors	need	to	sign	a	contract	with	the	Regional	Employment	
Centre	 (RAV).	 On	 a	 regional	 level,	 the	 local	 SEMO	 programmes	 are	 intercantonally	
coordinated	by	one	coordination	office	of	the	German-speaking	part	and	one	of	the	French-	
and	 Italian-speaking	 part	 of	 Switzerland.	 Both	 are	 in	 contact	 with	 the	 individual	 SEMO	
programme	providers	in	the	according	region.	Because	of	the	unique	nature	of	every	canton	
the	content	as	well	as	structure	of	SEMOs	differ	significantly.	Facing	this	diversity	and	lack	of	
unity,	 the	 SEMO	 coordination	 office	 organises	meetings,	workshops	 and	 coaching	 training	
courses	aiming	to	facilitate	the	communication	between	the	various	SEMO	organisations	and	
to	 create	 an	 intercantonal	 network,	 from	 which	 the	 organisations	 can	 benefit	 (Expert	 2,	
SEMO	 coordinator	 in	 German-speaking	 Switzerland,	 Canton	 Zug).	 The	 coordination	 office	
	
Figure	1:	Coordination	and	Organisation	of	SEMO	
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also	offers	 to	 represent	 the	 SEMO	organisations	when	 contacting	 the	 cantonal	 authorities	
when	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 communication	 or	 a	 crisis	 situation	 going	 on.	 Further,	 the	
coordination	office	is	in	contact	with	State	Secretariat	for	Economic	Affairs	(SECO)	and	sends	
it	annual	activity	reports	about	its	performance.	
4.1.4 Coordination and Organisation  
The	 requirements	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 SEMO	 programmes	 are	 specified	 in	 the	
unemployment	insurance	law	and	the	unemployment	insurance	ordinance	(AVIG/AVIV)	and	
include	the	regulations	 issued	by	the	State	Secretariat	 for	Economic	Affairs	 (SECO).	SEMOs	
are	primarily	coordinated	by	the	cantons	and	are	in	contractual	relationships	with	different	
local	 actors.	 14%	 of	 them	 are	 individual	 businesses,	 limited	 companies	 or	 incorporated	
companies.	The	other	86	%	consist	of	the	public	administration,	associations	and	non-profit	
societies.	The	variety	of	organisational	forms	can	be	demonstrated	by	the	example	of	Canton	
Basel-Stadt,	where	the	Office	for	Economy	and	Work	has	signed	contracts	with	five	different	
local	actors	who	coordinate	different	SEMO	programmes	and	appear	in	different	legal	forms.	
Compared	to	Canton	Basel-Stadt,	its	neighbour	Canton	Basel-Landschaft	does	not	offer	any	
SEMO	programmes.	 The	 cantons	 enjoy	 extensive	 freedom	 in	 developing	 their	 own	 labour	
market	 measures.	 Each	 canton	 has	 its	 own	 guidelines	 regarding	 the	 content	 of	 their	
programmes:	 In	 canton	 Zurich,	 school-based	 training	 must	 not	 exceed	 one	 day	 a	 week,	
whereas	 in	canton	Zug	the	young	people	enrolled	in	SEMO	have	school-based	training	two	
days	 a	 week.	 In	 an	 interview	 with	 the	 coordinator	 of	 the	 SEMO	 coordination	 office	 of	
German-speaking	Switzerland	 (Expert	2),	 it	was	emphasised	that	promoting	a	syllabus	with	
requirement	standards	amongst	all	cantons	is	hardly	possible.	The	problems	that	arise	from	
such	a	loose	vertical	coordination	are	manifold:	The	Federal	Office	for	Professional	Education	
and	Technology	 (BBT,	new	SERI10)	stated	 in	a	document	released	in	2011	that	this	 leads	to	
various	 problems	 such	 as	 a	 lack	 of	 sharing	 knowledge,	 overlapping	 and	 dysfunctions	 (BBT	
2011:	 36).	 As	 a	 response	 to	 this	 coordination	 problem,	 a	 new	 interinstitutional	 form	 of	
cooperation	 was	 created:	 The	VET	 Case	Management	 programme	 (CM	 BB),	 a	 centralised	
organisation	for	vocational	education	and	training	(for	detailed	information	about	CM	BB	see	
section	 4.3).	 Yet,	 despite	 new	 attempts	 to	 introduce	 more	 regulation,	 the	 decisions	
concerning	 how	 to	 build	 a	 network	 with	 CM	 BB	 and	 other	 ALMP	 measures	 or	 with	 the	
educational	system	and	potential	employers	lie	in	the	hands	of	the	individual	actors	and	are	
organised	 locally.	The	cooperation	between	the	different	actors	varies	greatly	 from	canton	
to	canton.	In	Canton	Zug	for	example	SEMO	has	a	well-functioning	cooperation	between	the	
CM	BB	and	the	institution	responsible	for	career	counselling,	whereas	in	Canton	Zurich	the	
CM	BB	 is	overburdened	and	does	not	have	 the	capacity	 to	be	 in	 intensive	communication	
with	the	SEMO	office	(Expert	2).	
																																								 																				
10	As	part	of	an	institutional	reform,	BBT	changed	to	SERI	in	2013.	The	State	Secretariat	for	Education,	Research,	
and	Innovation	(SERI,	https://www.sbfi.admin.ch)	is	in	charge	of	the	strategic	governance	and	development	of	
vocational	and	professional	education	and	training.	In	this	article	the	BBT	is	equated	to	the	SERI.	
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4.1.5 Conclusion 
The	SEMO	is	defined	by	a	loose	vertical	coordination	and	the	horizontal	coordination	lies	in	
the	responsibility	of	the	cantons	i.e.	the	cantonal	employment	agencies	and	other	cantonal	
departments.	 The	 programme	 is	 financed	 largely	 by	 the	 UI	 and	 to	 a	 small	 part	 by	 social	
services.	 Until	 2015,	 the	 success	 rate	 was	 defined	 as	 the	 success	 of	 SEMO	 participants	
finding	any	 transitional	 solutions	and	has	been	persistent	over	 the	past	years.	 In	2015	 the	
success	rate	was	61%.	In	the	new	evaluation	as	of	2016,	the	definition	of	the	success	rate	is	
differentiated	between	a	full	and	a	partial	transitional	solution.	A	partial	transitional	solution	
is	given	 if	 the	SEMO	participant	 is	able	to	a	 find	an	 internship	or	a	 job	and	 is	 therefore	no	
more	dependent	on	the	UI.	A	full	transitional	solution,	which	is	the	actual	aim	of	the	SEMO,	
is	to	enable	the	participants	to	enter	a	VET	programme	(or	a	grammar	school),	which	would	
enable	them	the	acquisition	of	a	degree	that	would	allow	them	to	find	a	qualified	job.	Yet,	
the	new	evaluation	criteria	do	not	measure	“soft	 factors”	 such	as	 subjective	well-being	or	
personal	growth.	This	could	be	seen	as	a	 shortcoming	of	 the	evaluation	statistics,	as	 since	
the	 level	 of	 the	 admission	 criteria	 of	 the	 SEMO	 is	 very	 low	 compared	 to	 other	 ALMP	
programmes	for	young	people,	SEMO	participants	often	show	difficult	 life	 trajectories,	not	
uncommonly	involving	drug	abuse	or	criminal	activities	(Expert	2).	Including	“soft	factors”	in	
the	evaluation	scheme	could	serve	a	better	understanding	of	the	impact	of	the	SEMO.	
4.2	“Praxisfirma”	–	Practice	Firm	
Praxisfirma	is	a	scheme,	which	offers	work	at	hypothetical	companies	to	people	with	a	VET	
certificate.	These	companies	can	mainly	be	 found	within	 the	 field	of	administration.	 It	 is	a	
national	programme	executed	by	the	local	cantonal	employment	agencies.	This	measure	has	
enabled	23'000	people	to	be	trained	in	17	years,	with	an	overall	placement	rate	of	51%.11	In	
2012,	 2'441	 young	 people	 participated	 in	 this	 programme	 and	 its	 costs	 amounted	 to	 20	
million	CHF	(SECO	2015:	3).	Besides	the	SEMO,	this	is	another	numerically	important	labour	
market	 integration	measure	 for	 young	 people	who	 claim	UI.	 The	 guiding	 principles	 of	 the	
strategy	 of	 the	 programme	 are	 learning	 by	 doing	 and	 improving	 professional	 skills.	 Skill	
improvement	 and	 the	 introduction	 to	work	 life	 should	 ease	 the	 entrance	 into	 the	 labour	
market.	 The	 practice	 firms	 trade	with	 fictional	 products	 and	 services	 and	 the	 participants	
receive	a	monetary	compensation	for	six	months.	They	act	like	real	businesses	and	comprise	
different	 departments	 like	 sales,	 marketing,	 and	 administration.	 Young	 people	 who	 have	
already	completed	a	VET	programme	are	given	priority	in	this	ALMP.	
4.2.1 Responsible Actors 
The	 implementation	 of	 a	 new	 Praxisfirma	 and	 its	 administrative	 lead	 is	 executed	 by	 an	
organising	institution.	The	organising	institutions	are	under	the	supervision	of	the	cantonal	
employment	agency.	They	manage	the	project	funding,	define	the	field	of	activity	 in	which	
the	practice	firms	operate	(e.g.	sport,	furniture,	services),	choose	the	practice	firms’	names,	
build	 the	structure	of	 the	organisation	and	define	 the	 legal	 form	of	 the	practice	 firms	 (i.e.	
Public	Limited	Companies,	 Limited	 Liability	 Companies,	 associations	 etc.).	 The	 goals	 of	 a	
																																								 																				
11	http://www.helvartis.ch/en/data/	[05.01.2017]	
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Praxisfirma	 are	 based	 on	 a	 performance	 agreement,	 which	 is	 signed	 by	 the	 cantonal	
employment	agency	and	the	organising	institutions	(SECO	2014:	2).	
4.2.2 Structure of Financing  
Praxisfirma,	 financed	 by	 the	 UI,	 counts	 as	 an	 educational	 measure	 and	 is	 one	 of	 three	
measures	 against	 unemployment	 that	 are	 listed	 in	 the	 unemployment	 insurance	 law	 (Art.	
59c	 bis.	 and	 60	 AVIG).	 Helvartis	 (http://www.helvartis.ch),	 a	 non-profit	 organisation12,	 is	
responsible	 for	 the	 coordination	 of	 the	 different	 (approx.	 60)	 practice	 firms.	 It	 hands	 in	 a	
petition	 for	 the	 funding	of	practice	 firms	 to	 the	Federal	Compensation	Office	 (ZAS)	once	a	
year.	This	petition	 is	examined	by	 the	Federal	Compensation	Office,	who	decides	 to	which	
extent	the	financing	will	take	place.	In	2014	the	financial	costs	amounted	to	13.5	million	CHF	
(SECO	2015:	3).		
4.2.3 Coordination of Public Actors at the Local Level  
Helvartis	coordinates	the	work	of	multiple	practice	firms	(Jugendsession,	2014).	Local	actors	
do	not	have	the	ability	to	create	a	Praxisfirma	on	their	own.	All	practice	firms	are	affiliated	
with	 Helvartis,	 who	 is	 a	 the	 head	 of	 each	 firm	 (see	 Figure	 1	 below).	 Helvartis	 itself	 is	
controlled	by	the	Federal	Compensation	Office,	which	determines	its	goals	 in	the	form	of	a	
performance	 agreement.	 The	 Federal	 Compensation	 Office	 is	 supported	 by	 an	 elected13	
workgroup	 called	Arbeitsgruppe	 Praxisfirmen,	which	 is	 composed	 of	 four	members	 of	 the	
participating	 cantons	 (cantonal	 labour	market	 authorities):	 one	member	 from	 the	 Federal	
Compensation	 Office,	 one	 representative	 from	 Helvartis,	 two	 representatives	 from	 the	
responsible	bodies	(i.e.	social	agencies	or	private	companies)	and	four	representatives	from	
different	practice	firms	(Seco	2014:	3).		
4.2.4 Coordination and Organisation  
In	total,	there	are	seven	actors	who	are	involved	in	this	measure	(see	Figure	1	above):	the	UI,	
the	Federal	Compensation	Office,	Helvartis,	 the	Arbeitsgruppe	Praxisfirmen,	 the	Organising	
Institutions	 inside	 the	 cantons,	 the	 Cantonal	 Labour	Market	 Authorities,	 and	 the	 practice	
firms	 themselves.	 The	 strategic	 leadership	 is	 divided	 into	 four	 areas	 in	 which	 different	
stakeholders	are	 involved:	 (1)	The	Federal	Compensation	Office,	 that	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	
assessment	of	 the	 funding;	 (2)	 the	Cantonal	Labour	Market	Authorities,	who	supervise	 the	
execution	of	this	measure	through	performance	agreements	contracted	with	the	organising	
	
																																								 																				
12	 Helvartis	 is	 a	 member	 of	 an	 international	 network	 of	 practice	 firms	 coordinated	 by	 EUROPEN-PEN	
International	 (PEN,	 http://www.penworldwide.org),	 a	 non-profit	 association	 that	 administers	 a	 worldwide	
network	 of	 over	 7’500	 practice	 firms	 in	 schools,	 colleges,	 universities,	 vocational	 training	 institutions,	
companies,	 and	 training	 centres	 in	 over	 40	 countries.	 This	measure	 is	 implemented	 in	 numerous	 European	
countries,	 such	 as	 in	 Bulgaria	 (BUCT,	 http://www.buct.org/intro.php),	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 (CEFIF,	
http://www.nuv.cz),	 Germany	 (ZUEF,	 http://www.die-zentralstelle.de),	 Luxembourg	 (Jonk	 Entrepreneuren,		
http://www.clee.lu),	 Poland	 (CENSYM,	 http://www.cku.zgora.pl),	 and	 Spain	 (Fundació	 Inform,	
http://inform.es/en).	
13	The	workgroup	is	elected	by	VSSA	(Verband	Schweizerischer	Arbeitsmarktbehörden)	
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Figure	2:	Coordination	and	Organisation	of	Practice	Firms	
	
institutions	 and	 the	practice	 firms;	 (3)	 the	Arbeitsgruppe	Praxisfirmen	 in	 cooperation	with	
Helvartis,	 who	 work	 together	 as	 a	 central	 administration	 office	 for	 the	 different	 practice	
firms;	 and	 finally	 (4)	 the	practice	 firms	 with	 their	 organising	 institutions	which	 are	 jointly	
responsible	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 this	 measure.	 Once	 a	 year,	 a	 Praxisfirma-Fair	 is	
organised,	 where	 the	 exchange	 of	 experiences	 and	 networking	 between	 the	 different	
stakeholders	 takes	place.	The	participation	at	 this	 fair	 is	optional	 for	 the	different	practice	
firms	and	costs	3’500	CHF.	
4.2.5 Conclusion 
Praxisfirma	is	a	well-organised,	internationally	established	programme,	and	the	cooperation	
between	 the	 involved	 institutions	 seems	 to	work	well.	 The	 implementation	 is	divided	 into	
four	 categories:	 The	 financing	 (Federal	 Compensation	 office	 and	 UI),	 the	
administration/coordination	 (Arbeitsgruppe	 Praxisfirmen	 and	 Helvartis),	 the	 supervision	
(Cantonal	Labour	Market	Authorities),	and	the	execution	 (organising	 institutions	 inside	 the	
cantons	 and	 the	 practice	 firms).	 This	 distribution	 of	 competencies	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	
well-functioning	cooperation	of	this	measure.	Regarding	the	number	of	participants	in	2014	
(1900),	the	expenditure,	which	amounted	to	13	million	CHF,	is	relatively	high.	Impact-wise,	
the	job	placement	rate	after	completing	training	in	a	Praxisfirma	has	dropped	constantly	in	
the	 past	 years	 from	 about	 80	 %	 in	 1995	 to	 about	 30%	 in	 2013.14	 The	 significant	 drop	 of	
placements	might	be	 linked	 to	 rising	 structural	unemployment	 for	 recent	graduates	 in	 the	
commercial	 field,	due	 to	 the	 increasing	digitalisation	and	 linked	decrease	of	 routine	office	
work.	 To	 sum	 up,	 Praxisfirma	 can	 be	 described	 as	 an	 innovative	 and	 well-organised	
																																								 																				
14	http://www.helvartis.ch/de/angaben/arbeitslosigkeit.php	[14.12.	2016]	
	18	
	
unemployment	measure	 with	 “best	 practice	 qualities”	 under	 favourable	 economic	 labour	
market	conditions.	
4.3	CM	BB	–	VET	Case	Management		
The	VET	 Cases	Management	 (“Case	Management	 Berufsbildung”,	 abbreviated	 as	 CM	 BB),	
launched	 in	 2007	 at	 the	 peak	 of	 the	 apprenticeship	 shortage	 of	 the	 2000s,	 intends	 to	
recognise	young	people	with	academic	problems	and	social	stresses	early	and	support	them	
until	 they	 graduate	 from	 the	 upper-secondary	 level.	 This	 national	 measure,	 which	 is	
executed	by	the	cantons,	targets	pupils	from	the	eighth	grade	up	to	24-year-olds	(BKS	2015:	
4).	 It	does	not	 result	 in	a	particular	 skill	 improvement	and	 is	not	a	support	measure	 itself.	
Instead	 of	 creating	 new	 measures,	 it	 aims	 at	 connecting	 the	 established	 programmes,	
persons,	 and	 institutions	 such	as	 career	advisory	 services,	 vocational	 supervisors,	 cantonal	
employment	agencies,	migration	departments,	and	social	departments,	 in	order	to	support	
the	coordination	of	 individual	cases	with	an	 inter-institutional	 team.	The	 launch	of	the	CM	
BB	was	 initially	 justified	with	existing	socio-political	problems	as	well	as	capacity	problems	
and	 dysfunctions	 in	 the	VET	 system	 and	 its	 preceding	 transitional	measures	 (Kraus	 2010).	
The	 CM	BB	 concentrates	 on	 adolescents	who	 are	 socially	 disadvantaged	 or	 low	 academic	
achievers.	From	2008	to	2015	 it	was	funded	by	the	Swiss	Federation	with	35,5	million	CHF	
and	 is	 now	 financially	 carried	 by	 the	 participating	 cantons	 (Ernst	 2015:	 9).	 In	 2012,	 1’630	
young	 people	 participated	 in	 a	 CM	BB	measure.	 Approximately	 50%	 of	 them	managed	 to	
complete	a	vocational	training	course.	18%	found	an	interim	solution,	13%	started	work	in	a	
profession	 and	 21%	were	 still	 seeking	 a	 solution	 (Egger,	 Dreher	&	 Partner	 AG	 2015,	 151).	
Today,	the	CM	BB	has	mostly	disappeared	and	only	remains	functional	in	a	few	cantons.	
4.3.1 Responsible Actors  
Every	canton	is	responsible	for	creating	its	own	system	that	can	recognise	young	people	with	
early	 job	 insecurity	 and	 that	 supports	 them	 until	 they	 have	 achieved	 an	 upper-secondary	
education.	The	 responsibilities	 include	coordinating	within	 the	cantons	and	controlling	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	measures	 across	 institutional	 borders	 (social	 services,	 employment	
agencies,	schools	etc.)	(Ernst	2015:	4).		
4.3.2 Structure of Financing  
Governmental	funding	initially	provided	support	for	the	cantons	to	build	and	implement	an	
independent	 body,	 which	 carries	 the	 CM	 BB	 within	 the	 cantonal	 structures.	 This	 should	
guarantee	the	measure	to	continue	after	the	government	stops	financing	it	(BBT	2010:	11).	
The	 financing	 of	 the	 CM	 BB	 is	 based	 on	 the	 Federal	 Act	 on	 Vocational	 and	 Professional	
Education	 and	 Training	 (BBG	 Art.	 54	 and	 55),	 which	 means	 that	 the	 government	 is	
responsible	for	financing	it	for	a	maximum	period	of	five	years	(BKS	2007:	7).	In	total,	there	
are	three	periods	of	funding:	The	initiation	period	(2008-2011)	during	which	the	government	
invested	 20	 million	 CHF	 in	 total,	 the	 consolidation	 period	 (2012-2015)	 during	 which	 the	
government	provided	up	 to	15.5	million	CHF,	and	 the	“continuation”	period,	during	which	
the	 cantons	 are	 fully	 responsible	 for	 the	 financing.	During	 the	period	of	 consolidation	 the	
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cantons	had	to	take	part	in	the	financing	by	increasing	their	funding	to	the	same	degree	that	
the	government	decreased	theirs	(Lüthi	2013:	19	).	
4.3.3 Coordination of Public Actors at the Local Level 
The	main	goal	of	the	CM	BB	is	that	the	cantons	develop	an	organ	of	surveillance,	which	can	
be	organised	and	run	by	itself.	In	order	to	receive	funding	from	the	government	the	cantons	
had	 to	 hand	 in	 an	 overall	 concept	 to	 the	 former	 BBT/SERI15	 (BKS	 2007:	 5).	 The	 BBT/SERI	
evaluated	the	concept	and	decided	whether	and	to	which	extent	the	funding	proposal	would	
be	approved.		
Once	 the	 cantons	had	 completed	 this	 evaluation	process,	 they	managed	 the	measures	on	
their	own.	It	has	been	shown	that	the	cantons	with	the	best	results	in	managing	the	CM	BB	
were	 those	with	 a	 centralised	 control	 over	 the	measures.	 Interdepartmental	 collaboration	
and	the	positioning	of	the	CM	BB	on	a	relatively	high	hierarchical	cantonal	level	can	be	seen	
as	the	two	key	factors	for	success	(Landert	2011:	7,	56).		
Figure	3:	Coordination	and	organisation	of	CM	BB	
	
 
4.3.4 Coordination and Organisation 
In	order	to	develop	a	strategy	for	the	CM	BB	the	cantons	orientated	themselves	towards	the	
former	Federal	Office	 for	Professional	Education	and	Technology	 (BBT)	guidelines.	The	BBT	
(SERI)	 helped	 the	 cantons	 to	 implement	 the	 CM	 BB	 and	 supported	 them	 financially	 (BKS	
2007:	5).	The	Swiss	Conference	 for	Vocational	Training	 (SBBK)	provided	counselling	 for	 the	
cantons	 for	 the	 implementation	of	 the	CM	BBs	and	offered	best	practice	advice.	After	 the	
cantonal	 implementation	 of	 the	 CM	BB	 the	 federal	 government	 continued	 to	 support	 the	
cantons	within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 so-called	 Interinstitutional	 Cooperation	 (IIZ)16.	While	
																																								 																				
15	BBT	was	integrated	into	the	State	Secretariat	for	Education,	Research	and	Innovation	(SERI)	in	2013.	SERI	is	in	
charge	of	the	strategic	governance	and	development	of	vocational	and	professional	education	and	training.	
16	The	Interinstitutional	Cooperation	(www.iiz.ch)	is	a	national	initiative(,)	aimed	at	improving	the	cooperation	
of	state	institutions	in	the	areas	of	labour	market	integration,	educational	integration,	social	security/social	aid,	
and	the	early	recognition	of	public	health	problems.	
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the	 coordination	within	 the	 cantons	works	well,	 an	 extensive	horizontal	 cooperation	does	
not	 exist	 due	 to	 the	 cantonal	 differences.	 A	 web-based	 platform	 called	 “CM	Online”	 was	
created	as	a	further	cantonal	support	measure.	A	few	cantons	used	this	platform	to	manage	
their	own	cases	and	to	provide	evaluation	data	for	the	Swiss	government.	A	cross-cantonal	
comparison	or	evaluation	 is	 very	difficult	 to	achieve	due	 to	 the	 social,	 economic,	political,	
and	managerial	differences	between	the	cantons.	Nevertheless,	for	this	report	two	cantons,	
Canton	 Basel-Stadt	 and	 Canton	 Aargau,	 were	 evaluated	 as	 case	 studies.	 The	 CM	 BB	
evaluations	of	both	cantons	were	studied	and	an	interview	with	Expert	3	(responsible	for	the	
coordination	of	the	VET	commission	at	the	Swiss	Conference	for	Vocational	Training	–	SBBK)	
was	conducted.		
Four	points	–	the	starting	conditions,	 the	political	positioning,	 the	cooperation	culture,	and	
the	political	process	–	are	analysed	and	compared	between	the	Basel-Stadt	and	Aargau.		
4.3.4.1	Starting	Conditions		 	
Before	the	CM	BB	programme	was	initiated	in	2007,	in	2005	the	Canton	BS	already	started	
to	 target	and	 take	care	of	young	people,	who	are	prone	 to	 job	 insecurity	 in	a	programme	
called	GAP	 (the	CM	BB	programme	of	 the	Canton	Basel-Stadt).	 In	2007	 the	guidelines	and	
impulses	 from	 the	 BBT	 concerning	 the	 CM	 BB	 were	 integrated	 in	 their	 own	 already	
developed	programme	structure.	In	contrast,	Canton	Aargau	started	developing	their	CM	BB	
programme	 Fachstelle	 Team	 1155	 (www.1155.ch)	 without	 any	 previously	 existing	
infrastructure.	With	the	federal	funds,	Canton	Aargau	experimented	with	different	ideas	and	
developed	a	structure	almost	from	the	scratch	(BKS	2015:	15).	Hence,	when	evaluating	new	
national	 programmes,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 keep	 the	 cantonal	 differences	 that	 existed	before	
the	implementation	of	the	programme	in	mind.		
4.3.4.2	Political	Positioning	
The	success	of	the	implementation	of	a	CM	BB	depends	to	a	great	degree	on	the	hierarchical	
positioning	of	the	CM	BB	within	the	cantonal	political	structure	and	its	accordingly	awarded	
authority	(Landert	2011:	56).	Canton	Basel-Stadt	successfully	entered	the	consolidation	state	
in	 2016	 with	 the	 CM	 BB	 (GAP)	 as	 an	 independent	 operating	 unit	 placed	 within	 the	
educational	 department.	 The	 strategic	 governance	 of	 the	 GAP,	 including	 executives	 from	
educational	,	social,	economic,	and	the	security	departments,	works	interdepartmental	and	
is	placed	in	a	high	hierarchical	position	(Haller,	Hümbelin	2011:	80).	In	canton	Basel-Stadt	the	
CM	BB	is	endowed	with	considerable	political	authority,	which	enables	this	programme	to	be	
sustainable.	
In	the	Canton	Aargau,	it	is	slightly	different.	With	the	CM	BB	agency	Fachstelle	Team	1155,	a	
cantonal	unit	was	created	which	can	act	interdepartmentally.	This	group	is	placed	inside	the	
section	 Vocational	 Preparation,	 Consultation	 and	 Further	 Training	 (BBW),	 which	 was	
reorganised	in	August	2014	(BKS	2015:	6).	The	CM	BB	agency	in	the	Canton	Aargau	does	not	
operate	from	a	position,	which	involves	as	many	executives	from	different	departments	as	in	
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Basel-Stadt.	Only	two	departments	are	directly	involved:	Fachstelle	Team	1155	is	supervised	
by	 the	 section	 for	 the	 Federal	 Vocational	 Baccalaureate	 (BM)	 and	 the	 Department	 of	
Education,	 Culture	 and	 Sport	 (BKS).	 In	 the	 evaluation	 report	 of	 2015	 it	 was	 stated:	 “The	
relationship	between	the	cooperation	partners	is	in	many	cases	personal	and	not	binding	for	
the	organisations.	There	is	a	lack	of	binding	commitments	from	the	involved	organisations…”	
(BKS	2015:	15).		
4.3.4.3	Cooperation	Culture	
Interdepartmental	 exchange	 and	 cooperation	 within	 the	 canton	 facilitate	 the	 access	 for	
participants	to	the	CM	BB	on	the	one	hand.	On	the	other	hand,	they	decrease	the	pressure	
on	 single	 actors	 by	 sharing	 it	 with	 other	 actors	 that	 are	 involved,	 which	 enhances	 the	
acceptance	of	the	measure.	In	cooperation	with	the	lower-secondary	education	schools,	the	
Canton	Basel-Stadt	created	a	tool	that	systematically	detects	risk	groups.	They	also	created	
tools,	which	simplify	the	cooperation	between	the	social	and	educational	departments,	that	
work	with	young	people	 in	upper-secondary	education	(Haller,	Hümbelin	2011:	81).	Today,	
Basel-Stadt	 has	 successfully	 established	 an	 interdepartmental	 exchange	 with	 50	 partner	
organisations	 (EDBS	 2015:	 22).	 An	 interinstitutional	 cooperation	 agreement	 regulates	 the	
coordination	between	 the	partners	as	well	as	 the	 transfer	of	 the	participants’	 cases	 (EDBS	
2015:	22).		
Canton	Aargau	has	acknowledged	that	 it	 is	crucial	 to	regulate	competencies,	which	enable	
the	 definition	 of	 goals,	 advisories,	 and	 assignments	with	 cooperation	 partners	 (BKS	 2015:	
10).	An	interdepartmental	commitment	is	considered	an	opportunity	if	the	CM	BB	is	given	a	
leadership	position	in	the	canton	(BKS	2015:	10).	
4.3.4.4	Political	Process		
As	already	stated	above,	 the	CM	BB	 is	a	national	measure	with	 loose	vertical	coordination	
due	to	Swiss	federalism.	Since	2015	the	cantons	are	supposed	to	consolidate	the	CM	BB	on	
their	own.	The	Swiss	Conference	for	Vocational	Training	(SBBK)	played	a	role	as	a	counsellor	
for	the	cantons	regarding	the	implementation	of	the	CM	BBs	and	gave	best	practice	advices,	
but	had	no	legislative	power.	The	withdrawal	of	national	funds	after	the	consolidation	period	
(2012-2015)	 was	 criticised	 by	 Expert	3	 who	 stated	 that	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 lack	 of	
sustainability:	“This	was	a	critical	situation	(…).	Some	cantons	dropped	the	CM	BB	and	others	
removed	the	funding	for	this	measure	from	their	cantonal	budget”.	Expert	3	also	suggested	
that	 sustainability	 could	 have	 been	 ensured	 by	 a	 binding	 commitment	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	
government	to	maintain	its	funds.	However,	facing	the	presence	of	different	interest	groups	
the	 initiative	 to	establish	 the	CM	BB	would	not	have	passed	the	national	council.	 Learning	
from	the	difficulties	encountered	in	the	implementation	of	the	CM	BB,	Expert	3	made	three	
recommendations,	which	may	be	considered	 in	the	future.	First,	 to	develop	a	binding	plan	
that	goes	beyond	the	point	of	time	when	the	national	funding	ends.	Second,	the	allocation	
of	responsibility	once	the	programme	ends.	Third,	to	organise	a	lobby	group	for	the	sake	of	
the	CM	BB	that	includes	members	from	academia.	
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4.3.5 Conclusion  
The	CM	BB	has	been	 institutionalised	 in	 some	cantons.	 Some	of	 them	used	 the	CM	BB	 to	
screen	and	optimise	their	previously	existing	surveillance	and	support	structures	for	young	
people	 who	 suffer	 from	 early	 job	 insecurity.	 Whereas	 at	 CM	 BB’s	 peak	 in	 2012/2013,	 21	
cantons	 used	 CM-Online,	 it	 is	 foreseeable	 that	 by	 2017	 only	 six	 cantons	 will	 continue	 to	
using	it.	Today	this	tool	has	mostly	disappeared,	which	makes	a	cross-cantonal	comparison	
and	 evaluation	 even	 more	 difficult.	 Nevertheless,	 15	 out	 of	 21	 cantons	 stated	 that	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 CM	 BB	 has	 improved	 case-focused	 interdepartmental	 cooperation	
and	 exchange.	 Seven	 out	 of	 these	 15	 cantons	 included	 the	 CM	 BB	 in	 their	 standard	
operations.	
5	Conclusion	
As	 a	 non-EU	 country	 Switzerland	 is	 not	 obliged	 to	 implement	 the	 EU	 Youth	 Guarantee	
scheme.	 Nevertheless,	 a	 similar	 national	 discourse	 on	 ensuring	 young	 people’s	 access	 to	
training	and	education	positions	took	place	in	a	Swiss	context	in	the	early	2000s,	when	there	
was	 a	 shortage	 of	 apprenticeship	 positions	 in	 the	 country.	 The	 previous	 public	 initiatives	
concerning	the	provision	of	a	sufficient	amount	of	apprenticeship	positions	with	the	aim	of	
implementing	a	youth	guarantee	in	the	constitution	in	2003	(nationwide)	and	2009	(Canton	
St	Gallen)	were	both	rejected.	The	results	of	the	votes	reflect	that	there	was	little	room	for	
more	 centralised	 state	 regulation	 and	 that	 the	 apprenticeship	 market	 was	 generally	
perceived	as	well-functioning	despite	its	shortage.	Nevertheless,	the	revised	Federal	Act	on	
Vocational	and	Professional	Education	and	Training,	passed	in	2002,	enabled	the	cantons	to	
establish	 solidarity	 funds,	which	 could	be	 spent	on	 the	development	of	 infrastructures	 for	
the	apprenticeship	market.	With	the	revised	Federal	Act	the	cantonal	authorities	are	able	to	
force	industries	to	make	contributions	to	their	respective	solidarity	funds.	Because	of	Swiss	
federalism	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 revised	VET	 law	 in	 the	 cantons	 is	 diverse.	While	 all	
French-speaking	 and	 Italian-speaking	 cantons	 have	 established	 a	 cantonal	 solidarity	 fund,	
almost	none	of	 the	German-speaking	cantons	have	done	so.	 Jura	and	Geneva	are	the	only	
cantons,	 which	 have	 the	 right	 to	 vocational	 education	 and	 training	 enshrined	 in	 their	
constitutions,	other	cantons	have	less	binding	regulations	regarding	VET	or	no	regulations	at	
all.		
Similarly,	the	Swiss	Active	Labour	Market	Policy	(ALMP)	landscape	differs	across	the	cantons,	
each	of	them	having	their	distinct	political	and	economic	situation.	In	order	to	adapt	to	the	
cantonal	diversity,	the	federal	government	has	set	up	a	loose	framework	for	ALMP	measures	
with	few	binding	guidelines	and	the	cantons	develop	their	own	measures	and	implement	the	
programmes.	A	plurality	of	actors	from	the	federal,	cantonal	and	local	levels	can	be	involved	
in	single	ALMP	programmes	and	as	a	result	the	horizontal	as	well	as	the	vertical	coordination	
oftentimes	 present	 the	 biggest	 challenge.	While	 in	 some	 cantons	 the	 coordination	 works	
well,	others	struggle	with	establishing	and	maintaining	the	programmes.	 In	the	case	of	the	
CM	BB	it	is	obvious	that	without	binding	guidelines	and	with	the	discontinuation	of	federal	
financial	aid,	many	cantons	are	not	willing	or	not	able	to	continue	such	a	scheme.	SEMO	and	
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Praxisfirma	on	the	other	hand	are	well	established	ALMP	programmes	in	most	cantons.	Still,	
the	implementation	of	SEMOs	and	Praxisfirma	is	organised	at	a	cantonal	level,	which	makes	
nationwide	 evaluations	 difficult.	 However,	 a	 positive	 overall	 evaluation	 of	 SEMOs	 and	
Praxisfirma	 seems	 possible.	 The	 success	 of	 the	 two	 programmes	 is	 not	 least	 due	 to	 the	
overall	 well-organised	 horizontal	 and	 vertical	 coordination,	 despite	 the	 difficulties	 and	
challenges	expressed	by	 some	actors	 involved.	Despite	 the	praise	 for	 the	ALMP	measures,	
there	 are	 also	 critics	 that	 suggest	 that	 most	 programmes	 overly	 emphasise	 the	 labour	
market	 integration	of	the	adolescents,	but	to	a	 lesser	degree	the	personal	development	of	
the	 individuals.	 This	 reflects	 the	 policies’	 concentration	 on	 economic	 growth,	 which	 is	
sometimes	promoted	at	the	expense	of	individual	well-being	(Leppanen	2015;	Imdorf	et	al.	
2016).		
The	 CM	 BB	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 will	 not	 be	 continued	 in	 many	 cantons	 now	 the	 financial	
support	from	the	Federal	government	has	stopped.	 It	has	been	criticised	that	the	planning	
for	the	implementation	of	the	CM	BB	wasn’t	sustainable	from	the	beginning.	Due	to	the	vast	
differences	 between	 the	 political,	 economic,	 and	 historical	 situations	 of	 the	 cantons,	 the	
successful	 implementation	 of	 a	 new	 national	 programme	 such	 as	 the	 CM	 BB	 varies	
accordingly.	 Ignoring	the	differences	of	the	pre-existing	situations	can	lead	to	difficulties	 in	
implementing	and	carrying	on	a	political	measure.	Hence,	the	Swiss	situation	can	be	seen	as	
mirroring	the	EU	 landscape	to	some	extent:	A	political	programme	 is	 initiated	by	a	central	
institution,	 the	 Federal	 government	 or	 the	 EU	 government,	 and	 its	 implementation	 lies	 in	
the	 hand	 of	 the	 cantons	 or	 the	 EU	 countries.	 Looking	 at	 the	 Swiss	 case	 can	 therefore	
contribute	to	a	better	understanding	of	the	implementation	of	policies	in	the	context	of	the	
EU.		
To	 conclude,	 the	 focal	 points	of	 Swiss	 youth	employment	policies	depend	on	 the	 stage	at	
which	 individual	 cases	 find	 themselves	 at	 in	 their	 transition	 from	 school	 to	 work	 and	
different	policies	take	effect	subject	to	the	successful	completion	of	a	first	upper-secondary	
education.	Young	people	with	only	compulsory	education	are	recommended	to	make	use	of	
ALMP	programmes	that	primarily	follow	an	enabling	approach,	aiming	to	help	young	people	
find	an	apprenticeship	place	or	to	enrol	for	a	continuing	middle	school.	However,	the	young	
unemployed	who	have	achieved	an	upper-secondary	degree	(VET	or	general	education)	will	
be	 supported	 with	 “job	 first”	 (ALMP)	 measures,	 which	 aim	 at	 preparing	 them	 for	 their	
entrance	 into	 the	 labour	market	 regardless	of	 their	education-employment	match.	 In	 fact,	
the	individual	is	considered	to	be	responsible	for	any	further	education	or	retraining	in	order	
to	 improve	 their	 labour	 market	 chances	 and	 find	 employment	 that	 is	 adequate	 for	 their	
education.	Finally,	 the	employment	assistance	model	 is	not	offered	 to	 the	unemployed	by	
default.	Instead,	selective	counselling	measures	that	offer	guidance	for	target	subgroups	are	
offered	on	a	local	level	(e.g.	mentoring	programmes	for	female	immigrant	adolescents	or	for	
disabled	people).	
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Interview	partners	
	
Expert	1	 	
Function	and	Institution:	Head	of	the	directorate	of	Vocational	Education	and	Training	and	
Higher	Education	(SFO)	in	Canton	Jura	
Location	of	the	institution:	Canton	Jura	
Link:	 http://www.jura.ch/DFCS/SFO.html		
Date	of	interview:	25.10.2016	
	
Expert	2	
Function	and	Institution:	Coordinator	at	SEMO	Coordination	German-speaking	Switzerland		
Location	of	the	institution:	Canton	Zug	
Link:	http://www.ch-semo.ch/default.asp?PROJECTID=120	
Date	of	interview:	18.10.2016	
	
Expert	3	
Function	and	Institution:	Person	in	charge	for	coordination	of	the	VET	commission	at	the	
Swiss	Conference	for	Vocational		
Location	of	the	institution:	Canton	Bern	
Link:	http://www.sbbk.ch/dyn/19669.php	
Date	of	interview:	11.10.2016	
